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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v, : Case No. 930345-CA 
JAMES ARTHUR BYRNS, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant.: 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conditional plea of no contest to one 
count of arranging to distribute a controlled substance, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1) (a) (ii) (1994), and one 
count of possession of a listed chemical with intent to 
manufacture, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-4 (1994) , both 
second degree felonies. This Court has jurisdiction over the 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (f) (Supp. 1994). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Does the doctrine of double jeopardy bar a state 
proceeding where the prior federal proceeding was dismissed before 
trial? 
2. Where a prior federal charge was dismissed on speedy trial 
grounds, does the collateral estoppel doctrine mandate dismissal of 
state charges on the same grounds? 
Where the underlying facts are undisputed, as in these two 
issues, the application of the law to the facts presents a legal 
question which is reviewed for correctness. State v. Ramirez, 817 
P.2d 774, 782 (Utah 1991). 
3. Did the trial court properly deny defendant's motion to 
dismiss for failure of the State to produce a witness where 
defendant did not establish the materiality of the witness? 
The determination of whether a witness is material presents a 
legal question. In reviewing that question, the appellate court 
should grant the trial court a considerable measure of discretion 
because of the fact-dependent nature of the determination. State 
v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939-40 (Utah 1994). 
4. In the absence of a complete record of relevant evidence 
on appeal, can this Court review the trial court's determination 
that defendant was not entrapped? 
Where an appellant fails to provide an adequate record on 
appeal, the reviewing court presumes the regularity of the 
proceedings below. Call v. City of West Jordan, 788 P. 2d 1049, 
1053 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
All relevant provisions, statutes, and rules are included in 
the text of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On August 7, 1991, as a result of a drug task force effort 
involving the D.E.A. and Utah County law enforcement officers, 
defendant was arrested and indicted in federal court on a single 
count of attempting to manufacture more than one kilogram of 
methamphetamine (R. 12, 19) . Based upon a violation of the federal 
2 
speedy trial act, the federal indictment was dismissed with 
prejudice prior to trial (R. 68) .1 
Shortly thereafter, on August 27, 1992, defendant was arrested 
and charged in state court with one count of arranging to 
distribute methamphetamine and two counts of possession of listed 
chemicals with intent to manufacture, charges arising out of the 
same activities that had engendered the federal charge. (R. 1-2) . 
Subsequently, defendant filed a variety of motions, both pro se and 
through two different counsel.2 
The trial court held a hearing on December 10, 1992, devoted 
primarily to defendant's contention that he had been entrapped.3 
The December hearing proceeded with the understanding that the 
trial court would take the matter under advisement pending 
testimony at a later date from Ross Argyle, an out-of-state witness 
whom the State agreed to try and locate with information provided 
by the defense (Tr. 5-8, 10) . 
On March 8, 1993, the trial court held a second hearing on the 
entrapment issue. According to a minute entry, the State reported 
that it could not locate the out-of-state witness (R. 132 or 
Addendum A) . The State then called two other witnesses and 
1
 The charge was dismissed after a hearing on August 25, 
1992. The order was entered on September 3, 1992 (R. 68). 
2
 Defendant moved for a determination of entrapment, filed a 
motion to dismiss on four different grounds, and moved both to 
secure the attendance of an out-of-state witness and for payment of 
witness fees and costs (R. 51-59, 89-98, 103-07, 109-114). 
3
 At the beginning of the December hearing, the parties 
agreed to submit most of the other issues defendant had raised on 
their respective memoranda (Tr. 3-4). 
3 
proffered the testimony of two more. The trial court took all 
matters under advisement (R. 132). On March 15, 1993, the court 
issued a written ruling, denying both defendant's motion to dismiss 
and his motion for determination of entrapment (R. 147-61 or 
Addendum B). 
Following a plea bargain in which the State promised to drop 
one count of possession of a listed chemical with intent to 
manufacture, delete the prior conviction enhancement, and recommend 
concurrent sentences, defendant entered a conditional plea of no 
contest (R. 135-43). This appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Ross Argyle, the out-of-state witness in this case, met 
defendant while they were both in custody in Oregon (Tr. 29) . 
Sometime later, Argyle was extradited to Utah (Tr. 13). While in 
the Utah County Jail, Argyle approached a Provo City police 
officer, indicating "that he knew some people who were involved in 
narcotics and would be willing to work with them in order to 
possibly help himself out" (Tr. 26) . Among other names, Argyle 
mentioned defendant's, stating that defendant had previously 
traveled to Utah to obtain precursor chemicals for the manufacture 
of methamphetamine (Tr. 27). 
Because defendant was residing out of state, the Provo police 
officer contacted the federal D.E.A. for assistance and was 
referred to a drug task force member, Charles Illsley (Tr. 29) . 
Illsley, whose expertise centered on clandestine drug labs and 
their related activities, became the chief investigating officer in 
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the case (Tr. 51, 52-55). Illsley met with Ross Argyle on August 
2, 1991 at the Provo City police department (Tr. 75) . 
Subsequently, Argyle placed two telephone calls to defendant in 
Reno, Nevada to discuss arrangements for setting up a meth lab in 
Utah County.4 See, e.g., Stip. Tr. of Telephone Conversation, 
8/2/91 at 10:20 am, p. 2, 5; 8/2/91 at 8:30 pm, p. 5. 
On August 3rd, Argyle, with Illsley present, telephoned 
defendant again to discuss details of the operation. Argyle 
eventually turned the telephone over to Illsley, so that defendant 
could talk directly to Argyle's "partner," who was purportedly 
fronting the money for the drug lab (Tr. 58-59; Stip. Tr. of 
Telephone Conversation, 8/3/91 at 8:55 pm, p. 2). After the 
evening of August 3rd, Illsley contacted defendant directly, and 
defendant had no further contact with Ross Argyle (Tr. 22, 62) . 
Argyle's work was complete.5 
On August 5th and 6th, defendant talked with Charles Illsley 
six times by telephone (See State's Exhibit #1) . In the course of 
these conversations, defendant specified in considerable detail the 
equipment and chemicals Illsley was to procure so that defendant 
could manufacture methamphetamine (Tr. 35-36, 63; Stip. Tr. of 
4
 All of the telephone conversations between defendant and 
Ross Argyle, and defendant and Charles Illsley, between 10:20 am on 
August 2, 1991, and through August 6, 1991, were recorded and 
transcribed, and are part of the record on appeal. See State's 
Exhibit #1. 
5
 On August 9th or 10th, after defendant had been arrested, 
Illsley paid Ross Argyle $2000 from D.E.A. funds (Tr. 86, 89) . 
Argyle apparently used the money to pay fines in Utah County. He 
was subsequently released and left the jurisdiction (Tr. 31-32). 
5 
Telephone Conversations: 8/3/91 at 8:55 pm, p. 9-12; 8/6/91 at 2:53 
pm, p. 3-13) . After the two men had talked about procuring 
precursor chemicals and drugs, Illsley let defendant know that he 
was also interested in learning how to make methamphetamine (Tr. 
77). Defendant told Illsley it would cost him $10,000 in cash to 
learn (Tr. 62-63, 77; Stip. Tr. of Telephone Conversation, 8/3/91 
at 8:55 pm, p. 16-17). Defendant also stated that he wanted part 
of the proceeds from the sale of the drugs he would manufacture 
(Stip. Tr. of Telephone Conversation, 8/3/91 at 8:55 pm, p. 17). 
On August 7th, defendant took a bus from Reno to Wendover, 
where Charles Illsley met him in a white Corvette and drove him to 
a mobile home in Lindon, Utah.6 Once on the site, Illsley showed 
defendant a stack of bills amounting to $10,000, the agreed-upon 
"teaching fee" (Tr. 83) . Pursuant to defendant's instructions, all 
the equipment he had specified was in the mobile home (Tr. 63) . 
Defendant then made a list of miscellaneous items still needed for 
the manufacture process (Tr. 69-70). When those had been procured, 
defendant began the manufacture process by pouring bottles of 
ephedrine pills into gallon jugs of distilled water (Tr. 72-73). 
Illsley then told defendant he needed to talk with him outside. At 
that juncture, a van drove up to the mobile home, Provo City's 
S.W.A.T. team emerged, and defendant was arrested (Tr. 73). 
6
 The mobile home had been wired for video and sound by two 
D.E.A. technicians (Tr. 64). The trial court viewed portions of 
the videotape during the December 10th hearing (Tr. 65-70). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The doctrine of double jeopardy does not apply to this case. 
Because the federal charge against defendant was dismissed prior to 
trial, jeopardy never attached in the federal action. Therefore, 
there can be no double jeopardy resulting from the subsequent state 
proceeding. 
Neither can defendant prevail under the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel, which "means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact 
has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue 
cannot again be litigated between the parties in any future 
lawsuit." Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970). Defendant 
fails to meet any of the requirements of this doctrine. First, 
defendant's underlying premise that the state and federal actions 
in this case were the acts of a single sovereign, is entirely 
unsupported. Defendant has mistakenly equated cooperation between 
state and federal investigators with collusion between state and 
federal prosecutors in charging defendant. Because the actions of 
the state and federal governments were those of separate 
sovereigns, the parties to the state and federal actions were not 
the same. 
Second, no issue of ultimate fact was determined by the prior 
federal proceeding. The only conclusive determination emerging 
from the federal proceeding was that defendant had been denied his 
statutory right to be tried within the prescribed time frame. 
Finally, no substantive issues were litigated in the federal 
proceeding. The federal proceeding ended with an order to dismiss 
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with prejudice. Nothing was litigated. 
Because defendant failed to prevail on any of the elements of 
the collateral estoppel doctrine, his argument that the trial court 
committed reversible error by failing to dismiss the state charges 
after the federal court dismissed the federal charges fails. 
Defendant's argument that the trial court erred by denying his 
motion to dismiss for failure of the State to produce a material 
witness must similarly fail. A close reading of the first 
entrapment hearing record reveals that both parties wanted to hear 
from the witness, and that the State offered to try and locate the 
witness with information that the defense agreed to provide. The 
trial transcript plainly reveals that the trial court did not 
directly rule on defendant's motion to compel attendance, nor did 
it make any finding concerning the materiality of the witness. 
Later in the same hearing, when the matter of the missing witness 
was discussed again, defendant speculated at length about the 
potential content of his testimony. 
At the second hearing, when the witness had not been located, 
the court examined the overwhelming record evidence against 
defendant and properly determined that defendant had failed to 
carry his burden of demonstrating the materiality of the missing 
witness. 
Finally, while defendant has raised the issue of entrapment, 
he has failed to include in the record on appeal the transcript of 
the second entrapment hearing. In the absence of a complete record 
of relevant evidence on appeal, this court must presume the 
8 
regularity of the proceedings below, including the trial court's 
determination that defendant was not entrapped. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE DOCTRINE OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
UNDER THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION IS INAPPLICABLE IN 
THIS CASE BECAUSE JEOPARDY NEVER 
ATTACHED IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 
It is axiomatic that a defendant is placed in jeopardy at the 
time the jury is empaneled and sworn or, in the case of a bench 
trial, when the first witness is sworn. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 
28, 37 (1978). Because the federal charge against defendant was 
dismissed prior to trial, no jeopardy attached in that action. Cf. 
State v. Brickev, 714 P.2d 644, 646 (Utah 1986); State v. Harris, 
517 P.2d 1313, 1314 (Utah 1974). The pretrial disposition in 
defendant's federal case cannot implicate double jeopardy because 
"an accused must suffer jeopardy before he can suffer double 
jeopardy." Serfass v. United States. 420 U.S. 377, 393 (1975). 
Defendant's federal charge was dismissed pursuant to a motion 
made under 18 U.S.C. § 3162, the federal speedy trial act, which 
gives the trial court discretion to grant the motion with or 
without prejudice (R. 68) . Defendant has mistakenly equated the 
federal court's grant of his motion to dismiss with prejudice with 
the attachment of jeopardy under the Fifth Amendment. The doctrine 
of double jeopardy, however, is simply inapplicable to this case. 
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POINT TWO 
BECAUSE THE COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL 
DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY TO THIS 
CASE, DISMISSAL OF THE FEDERAL 
CHARGE ON SPEEDY TRIAL GROUNDS 
DID NOT REQUIRE THE STATE COURT 
TO DISMISS THE STATE CHARGES 
Defendant relies on the collateral estoppel aspect of the 
double jeopardy doctrine to argue that the trial court committed 
reversible error by failing to dismiss the state charges after the 
federal court dismissed the federal charges on the grounds that 
defendant's right to a speedy trial had been violated. 
Collateral estoppel "means simply that when an issue of 
ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final 
judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the parties 
in any future lawsuit." Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970). 
"Unlike the successive prosecutions prong of the double jeopardy 
protection . . . this [collateral estoppel] aspect of the clause is 
implicated by the pretrial disposition of a prior case if an 
ultimate issue in the second prosecution was conclusively litigated 
and necessarily determined as part of the judgment entered in the 
first case." United States v. Blackwell, 900 F.2d 742, 745 (4th 
Cir. 1990); see also United States v. Belcher, 762 F. Supp. 666, 
670 (W.D. Va. 1991) (citing Blackwell for this proposition). 
In order for collateral estoppel to apply and, consequently, 
for defendant to win his argument, defendant must prevail in three 
determinations: first, that the parties involved in both actions 
were the same; second, that an ultimate issue of fact was 
determined in the prior federal proceeding; and third, that the 
10 
matter was conclusively litigated in the prior federal proceeding. 
See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. at 443. 
A. Because the actions of the state and federal governments 
were plainly those of separate sovereigns, the parties to the 
state and federal actions were not the same. 
Defendant's essential contention is that the involvement of 
state and local law enforcement officers in the investigation 
preceding the federal indictment rendered state and federal 
prosecutions in this case effectively the acts of a single 
sovereign. Because the state and federal prosecutors were acting 
as one sovereign, claims defendant, the speedy trial date for the 
state prosecution should be the same as that for the federal 
prosecution. Thus, dismissal of the federal case should also bind 
the State (Br. of App. at 9-10}. Defendant also argues that the 
alleged "delay" in filing the state charges violated his right to 
due process (Br. of App. at 11). 
This Court can only reach defendant's conclusion that the 
federal proceeding should bar the subsequent state prosecution if 
it first accepts defendant's underlying premise that the state and 
federal actions involved in this case were, in actuality, the acts 
of a single sovereign. To do so, this Court must find that an 
exception to the dual sovereignty doctrine governs this case. 
Defendant's argument, however, is rooted in a fundamental 
misunderstanding of both the dual sovereignty doctrine and the 
limited exception that defendant wishes to apply to his case. The 
dual sovereignty doctrine is a "well-established principle that a 
federal prosecution does not bar a subsequent state prosecution of 
11 
the same person for the same acts." United States v. Wheeler. 435 
U.S. 313, 316-17 (1978). It is based on the principle that each 
sovereign promulgates its own laws and has independent power to 
prosecute offenses against it. 
The dual sovereignty doctrine is founded on 
the common law conception of crime as an 
offense against the sovereignty of the 
government. When a defendant in a single act 
violates the "peace and dignity" of two 
sovereigns by breaking the laws of each, he 
has committed two distinct "offences" 
[sic]. . . [W] hen the same act transgresses 
the laws of two sovereigns, "it cannot be 
truly averred that the offender has been twice 
punished for the same offense; but only that 
by one act he has committed two offenses, for 
each of which he is justly punishable." 
State v. Franklin, 735 P.2d 34, 36 (Utah 1987) (quoting Heath v. 
Alabama. 106 S. Ct. 433, 437 (1985) (citation omitted)). 
The policy underlying the dual sovereignty doctrine has been 
explicitly endorsed by the Utah Supreme Court under factual 
circumstances similar to this case. In State v. Franklin, a state 
prosecution also followed a federal proceeding. There, the Court 
observed that abandoning the dual sovereignty doctrine in favor of 
defendant's preferred position that the federal proceeding would 
bar the subsequent state proceeding "relinquishes unnecessarily the 
power of the state to try and punish those who break its laws." 
Franklin, 73 5 P.2d at 38. The Court elaborated: 
Under the rule urged by defendant, the State 
of Utah would be foreclosed from legitimate 
prosecutions by the errors, omissions, or 
inadequacies of federal prosecutions and would 
be unable to try even a defendant who had 
received a federal pardon or whose conviction 
was reversed by a federal appellate court 
because of an error in the federal 
12 
trial . . . . We note also that the approach 
urged by defendant, under which the federal 
prosecution would be treated as if it were a 
Utah proceeding, would allow the federal 
government to destroy Utah's right to try 
defendant merely by bringing defendant to 
trial for some lesser included offense . . . . 
Were we to hold that Utah could not try 
individuals because they had been previously 
tried in a federal court, we still could not 
prevent the federal government from trying 
individuals after they had been tried by Utah; 
we would thus be surrendering state 
sovereignty in exchange for a more theoretical 
than real gain in individual rights. 
Id. This endorsement of the policy underlying the dual sovereignty 
doctrine effectively closes the door on defendant's due process 
argument that the federal violation of the speedy trial act, which 
resulted in defendant's incarceration for a year prior to dismissal 
of the federal charge, should be charged against the State. The 
State cannot be held responsible for errors committed by the 
federal sovereign. The trial court so held, and defendant has 
offered no persuasive argument or authority to the contrary. See 
Trial Court Ruling at 8 or Addendum B. 
Defendant would like his case to fall within a "narrow 
exception to the 'dual sovereignty' doctrine, where one prosecuting 
sovereign can be said to be acting as a 'tool' of the other, or 
where the second prosecution amounts to a 'sham and a cover' for 
the first." United States v. Aboumoussallem. 726 F.2d 906, 910 (2d 
Cir. 1984) (citing Barktus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959)) 
(citation omitted). When a second prosecution is merely a 'sham' 
for continuing the prosecution initiated by the first sovereign, 
the philosophical basis for the dual sovereignty doctrine is 
13 
undermined and double jeopardy concerns are clearly implicated. 
For his argument, defendant relies primarily on United States 
v. Belcher, 762 F. Supp. 666 (W.D. Va. 1991) . In that case, 
successive prosecutions charging identical crimes were brought 
first in state court and then in federal court by a single 
prosecutor with coincident authority to prosecute in both 
jurisdictions. Calling this situation "extremely unusual," the 
Belcher court found that "[t]he fact that the two sovereigns have 
essentially pooled their powers in one prosecutor strongly suggests 
. . . that in reality there are no longer two sovereigns at work." 
Id. at 671, 673. 
Defendant's argument fails because the facts of this case 
clearly demonstrate that the state and federal prosecutions were 
separate entities. Furthermore, there was no record evidence 
supporting defendant's conclusion that the state and federal 
prosecutors were acting in concert in filing charges under federal 
and state law. Defendant has mistakenly equated cooperation 
between state and federal law enforcement investigators with 
collusion between state and federal prosecutors in charging 
defendant.7 (See Br. of App. at 9) . 
7
 Defendant cites to State v. Shabata, which makes passing 
reference to the fact that " [information known to police officers 
working on a case is charged to the prosecution since the officers 
are part of the prosecution team." State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 785, 
788 (Utah 1984). That case addressed whether the prosecutor's 
withholding of certain evidence denied defendant a fair trial. It 
has no particular relevance to this case, dealing with state and 
federal law enforcement personnel working in concert in a case in 
which separate federal and state charges are eventually filed. 
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Several courts have noted that joint federal-state 
investigative efforts do not create a "sham" prosecution. United 
States v. Bernhardt, 831 F.2d 181, 182 (9th Cir. 1987) ("It is 
clear that the Bartkus exception does not bar cooperation between 
prosecuting sovereignties."); Aboumoussallem, 726 F.2d at 910 ("At 
most, there was here no more than a joint investigation of criminal 
activity, which we have held does not preclude separate 
prosecutions."); Belcher, 762 F. Supp. at 671 n.3 ("The court does 
not mean to suggest that cooperation between State and federal law 
enforcement officials is not expected and hoped for . . . . " ) . 
Neither does the fact that the federal proceeding ended before 
the state charges were filed create a sham. See Aboumoussallem, 
726 F.2d at 910 n.3. The prudence of state prosecutors deferring 
until federal prosecutions are concluded is well-documented. See, 
e.g. , People v. Gates, 743 P.2d 301, 315-17 (Cal. 1987), cert, 
denied, 486 U.S. 1027 (1988); People v. Bradford, 549 P.2d 1225, 
1234 (Cal. 1976). 
Defendant has produced no evidence to demonstrate that the 
state and federal prosecutors were acting in concert and no 
persuasive legal authority to support his conclusion that the 
"sham" exception to the dual sovereignty doctrine should apply. 
Because defendant has failed to meet the first requirement of the 
dual sovereignty doctrine--that the parties to both actions were 
the same--his collateral estoppel argument fails. 
B. An issue of ultimate fact was not determined in the 
federal proceeding. 
Defendant's collateral estoppel argument also fails to meet 
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the second requirement of that doctrine. The federal proceeding 
terminated with an order of dismissal with prejudice because 
defendant's statutory right to a speedy trial within the federal 
system had been violated8 (R. 68) . Thus, the only conclusive 
determination emerging from the federal proceeding was that 
defendant had been denied his statutory right to be tried within 
the prescribed time period. Because the substantive merits of the 
federal drug charge were never reached, no issues of ultimate fact 
were conclusively determined by a final judgment. See Ashe v. 
Swenson, 379 U.S. at 443. 
C. No substantive issues were litigated in the federal 
proceeding. 
Finally, the federal proceeding ended with an order to dismiss 
with prejudice. Nothing was litigated in the first proceeding. 
Nothing was decided as to the merits of defendant's case. 
Because defendant failed to prevail on any--let alone all 
three--of the requirements of the collateral estoppel doctrine, 
his claim that the trial court committed reversible error by 
failing to dismiss the state charges after the federal court 
dismissed the federal charges must fail. The collateral estoppel 
doctrine does not apply to this case. 
8
 In contrast, defendant did not assert that his Sixth 
Amendment right to a speedy trial had been violated. See United 
States v. Grismore, 564 F.2d 929, 932 (10 Cir. 1977). 
16 
POINT THREE 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
FOR FAILURE OF THE STATE TO 
PRODUCE A MATERIAL WITNESS 
Defendant asserts that he was denied his constitutional right 
to compulsory process by the State's inability to locate Ross 
Argyle, an out-of-state witness in whom both the defense and the 
State were interested. For this proposition, defendant seems to be 
relying on the court's acceptance of the State's offer to try and 
locate Argyle with information provided by the defense. He 
interprets this acceptance as an affirmative ruling on defendant's 
motion to compel attendance of the out-of-state witness and, by 
implication, as a finding that Argyle was a "material witness," 
within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 77-21-3 (1995) . Defendant, 
however, has misconstrued both the law and the facts. 
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees that 
"[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 
. . . to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor. ..." The United States Supreme Court has determined that 
where a defendant had been deprived arbitrarily of "testimony 
[that] would have been relevant and material, and . . . vital to 
the defense," he was denied his right to compulsory process. 
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 16 (1967). In order to establish 
a violation of his constitutional right to compulsory process, a 
defendant has the burden of showing that the testimony of the 
absent witness "would have been both material and favorable to his 
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defense." State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264, 274 (Utah 1985) 
(quoting United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal. 458 U.S. 858, 873 
(1982) . 
The test for materiality has been articulated by the Utah 
Supreme Court: "Testimony is material, and its exclusion is 
therefore prejudicial, if there is a reasonable probability that 
its presence would affect the outcome of the trial. 'A reasonable 
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in 
the outcome.'" Schreuder, 712 P.2d at 274 (quoting Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). In applying this test, the 
overriding concern is for the justness of the result: 
This means that the omission must be evaluated 
in the context of the entire record. If there 
is no reasonable doubt about guilt whether or 
not the evidence is considered, there is no 
justification for a new trial. On the other 
hand, if the verdict is already of 
questionable validity, additional evidence of 
relatively minor importance might be 
sufficient to create a reasonable doubt. 
State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d at 275 (quoting United States v. 
Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 868). 
In this case, contrary to defendant's assertion, the trial 
court did not determine prior to the first entrapment hearing that 
Ross Argyle was a material witness. At the beginning of that 
hearing, the trial court considered defendant's motion to secure 
the attendance of out-of-state witness. (See R. 109-12). When it 
became clear that both the prosecution and the defense wanted to 
hear from Ross Argyle, the court determined that the most 
expeditious procedure would be for the State to locate and subpoena 
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Argyle with information provided by the defense (Tr. 5-9).9 The 
trial transcript plainly reveals, however, that the trial court did 
not directly rule on defendant's motion to compel attendance nor 
did it make any finding concerning Argyle's materiality.10 
Subsequently, after all of the witnesses at the December 10th 
entrapment hearing had been heard, the court pursued the issue of 
Argyle's testimony with defendant: 
What is your intent with [Ross Argyle] ? If you 
could proffer as it relates to your position 
today, what would you state? That doesn't bar 
you or stop you from calling him and 
presenting additional information. But what 
critical factors or what substance are 
involved that would have bearing upon the 
Court's determination . . . on this motion? 
(Tr. 92-93). In essence, after having heard substantial evidence 
that weighed heavily against defendant, the court asked defendant 
to make a "plausible showing" that the addition of testimony from 
Ross Argyle would create a reasonable probability that the 
evidentiary balance would tip in his favor. See State v. 
Schreuder, 712 P.2d at 274-75. 
9
 To that end, the court asked defendant to prepare an order 
consistent with the agreement of the parties and the court (Tr. 9) . 
Although such an order does not appear in the record on appeal, the 
substance of the agreement is reflected in the minute entry of 
December 10, 1992 (R. 126) . 
10
 Defendant claims that because the State did not seek 
clarification of the materiality issue, the assumption should be 
that Argyle was a material witness (See Br. of App. at 15). The 
burden was on defendant, however, to make such a showing. 
Schreuder, 712 P.2d at 274-75. Furthermore, if the trial court 
failed to rule on the issue specifically, it was defendant's 
responsibility to pursue the matter. Defendant failed to do this, 
instead agreeing to prepare an order reflecting the substitute 
agreement of the parties to work together to locate the witness 
(Tr. 6-9). 
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Defendant did not respond by making a proffer regarding the 
contents of Argyle's testimony. Instead, he responded that, 
although the police officers had testified that Argyle was not 
working as their agent prior to the time that they placed the tape-
recorded phone calls from the Provo police station, he believed the 
facts might be otherwise (Tr. 93-94). Defendant also stated that 
he wanted to obtain certain court records related to Argyle's 
probation termination hearing and other underlying cases as they 
might relate to an agency relationship between Argyle and the 
police or some possible inducement by the police prior to the time 
the phone recordings began (Tr. 94-95).11 In essence, defendant 
admitted that he did not know how Argyle would testify, but that 
defendant would try to establish that Argyle was a police agent 
earlier than the record evidence indicated and that Argyle 
entrapped defendant into manufacturing methamphetamine. Rather 
than making a proffer, then, defendant simply speculated about what 
he thought the witness might say. "A mere allegation of 
materiality does not justify a finding that a witness is material." 
State v. Lairbv, 699 P.2d 1187, 1195 (Utah 1984). 
When the witness could not be located, the trial court acted 
properly in evaluating the whole record before it, which plainly 
demonstrated the limited nature of the relationship between Ross 
Argyle and the local law enforcement officers, and in determining 
that defendant had failed to carry his burden of demonstrating that 
11
 The minute entry for the subsequent entrapment hearing 
reflects that defendant did not offer any further documentation 
related to Argyle (R. 132 or Addendum B). 
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Argyle was a material witness.12 The trial court so ruled: 
There was no evidence presented to the Court 
that Argyle was an agent for the DEA or other 
law enforcement agency prior to his 
extradition to Utah. Only by making some kind 
of showing that Argyle was an agent while 
incarcerated with the defendant could the 
defendant raise the materiality of Argyle's 
actions during that period. 
(R. 148 or Addendum B). 
Given the overwhelming record evidence against defendant on 
the entrapment charge, including the testimony of three law 
enforcement investigators, tape-recorded telephone conversations, 
and a videotape of defendant at work in the methamphetamine lab, 
the trial court properly concluded that Ross Argyle was not a 
material witness. Accordingly, the trial court did not commit 
error in denying defendant's motion to dismiss for failure of the 
State to produce a material witness. 
12
 Defendant also complains that the trial court did not enter 
findings that the State made adequate efforts to locate Argyle. 
The court's ruling states: "The State was not able to locate 
Argyle and Mr. Taylor proffered that the State had attempted to 
locate Argyle at the address provided by defense counsel, attempted 
to locate him in Utah and in Oregon, and that the State had placed 
an investigator on the problem without avail" (R. 148 or addendum 
a). Implicit in this ruling is that the State's efforts were 
adequate. Additionally, defendant has failed to include the 
transcript of the relevant hearing in the record on appeal. 
Because defendant has failed to include all of the evidence 
relevant to his claim, it cannot be fully addressed, and the 
regularity of the proceedings below must be presumed. Call v. City 
of West Jordan, 788 P.2d 1049, 1053 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 800 
P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990). 
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POINT FOUR 
IN THE ABSENCE OF A COMPLETE 
RECORD OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE ON 
APPEAL, THIS COURT CANNOT REVIEW 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION 
THAT DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTRAPPED 
AND MUST, THEREFORE, PRESUME THE 
REGULARITY OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
BELOW 
Defendant asserts that the trial court committed reversible 
error by denying his motion to dismiss on the grounds of entrapment 
(Br. of App. at 17) . The record on appeal, however, does not 
include the transcript of the entire entrapment hearing upon which 
the trial court's ruling was based. Specifically, defendant has 
failed to include in the record on appeal the transcript of the 
second entrapment hearing, held on March 8, 1993. Because 
defendant has failed to include the complete record of evidence 
dealing with the issue he wishes this Court to review, his claim 
must fail. 
The first entrapment hearing was held on December 10, 1992. 
At the conclusion of that hearing, after the parties had agreed to 
work together to locate Ross Argyle, the out-of-state witness, the 
trial court stated, "Well, I'll take the matter under advisement as 
it relates to the Motion on the Entrapment with the anticipation, 
then, that there would either be further documentation that would 
be submitted to the Court or further testimony that would be 
elicited from Ross Argyle, if he can, in fact, be located" (Tr. 
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95) .13 
The court then held a second entrapment hearing on March 8, 
1993, commemorated in the record on appeal only by a minute entry 
(R. 131-32 or Addendum A) . The minute entry reflects the 
following: the State gave a status report about its attempt to 
locate Ross Argyle; the State proffered the testimony of Stan Egan, 
a police officer who had testified at the earlier hearing, and of 
S.R. Fenter, an individual who is nowhere else referred to in the 
record on appeal; Charles Illsley, the D.E.A. chief investigating 
officer who testified at the first hearing, testified a second 
time, and a copy of transcribed telephone conversations was 
admitted into evidence; and Cliff Cardall, a witness for the State, 
testified and was cross-examined. Id. The court then took the 
matter under advisement. 
Rule 11(e) (2) , Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires the 
appellant to include in the record a transcript of all evidence 
relevant to any finding or conclusion appellant claims is 
unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence. "In essence, Rule 
11 directs counsel to provide this court with all evidence relevant 
to the issues raised on appeal." Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 
1002 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 776 P.2d 916 (Utah 1989). Where an 
appellant fails to provide an adequate record on appeal, the 
reviewing court presumes the regularity of the proceedings below. 
13
 The trial court's ruling of March 15, 1993 also reflects 
the court's intent to take the matter under advisement and to 
continue the proceedings so that its decision would be based on a 
full evidentiary picture. See R. 159 or Addendum A at 3. 
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Call v. City of West Jordan, 788 P.2d 1049, 1053 (UtahApp.), cert, 
denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990); State v. Linden, 761 P.2d 1386, 
1388 (Utah 1988) (jury voir dire recorded but not transcribed). 
The burden to ensure that the record contains the materials 
necessary to support an appeal rests with the appellant. State v. 
Linden, 761 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Utah 1988); State v. Theison, 709 P.2d 
307, 309 (Utah 1985) . This Court will not "speculate on the 
existence of facts that do not appear in the record." Id. "Absent 
that record[,] defendant's assignment of error stands as a 
unilateral allegation which the review court has no power to 
determine. This Court simply cannot rule on a question which 
depends for its existence upon alleged facts unsupported by the 
record." State v. Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1993) (emphasis 
omitted) (citations omitted). 
Because a transcript of the second entrapment hearing is not 
part of the record on appeal, this Court cannot ascertain the 
substance of that hearing or review the trial court's final 
determination, based on the content of the two hearings, that 
defendant was not entrapped. Consequently, this Court should 
presume the regularity of the proceedings below and affirm the 
trial court's determination that defendant was not entrapped. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
conviction. 
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ORAL ARGUMENT 
Because of the complexity of the issues raised and their fact-
specific nature, the State believes that oral argument would 
significantly aid the decisional process in this case. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ^ _ daY o f March, 1995. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the 
foregoing brief of Appellee were mailed first-class, postage 
prepaid, to Michael D. Esplin, Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin, 
Attorney for Defendant, 43 East 200 North, P.O. Box "L", Provo, 
Utah 84603-0200, this 2 L daY o f March, 1995. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
Minute Entry of March 8, 1993 
- ~ F 1 L E H 
IN THE FOURIH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUgj^ f j ' -^ 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH ^ ^ V ^ 
t ot 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
JAMES BYRNS, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant, 
CASE NO. 92140045*\( 
DATE: March 8, 1993 
LYNN W. DAVIS, JUDGE 
Rpt. Beverly Lowe, CSR 
Clerk: Cindy Williamson 
HEARING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR ENTRAPMENT 
This matter came before the Court for hearing on defendant's motion for 
entrapment. James Taylor, Deputy County Attorney, appeared for and in behalf of the State 
of Utah. The defendant was present and represented by Michael D. Esplin. 
Mr. Taylor addressed the Court with a status report as to the state's attempted to 
locate a Mr. Argyle. 
Mr. Taylor further addressed the Court and proffered the testimony of Stan Egan 
and an S.R. Fenter. 
Charles Illsley was sworn and tetified on direct by Mr. Taylor. 
State's exhibit #1, copy of transcript , marked and rec'd. 
Mr. Esplin objected to the Court's receiving the exhibit. The Court received the 
exhibit over the objection of Mr. Esplin. 
Cliff Cardall was sworn and testified on direct by Mr. Taylor. Cross examination 
by Mr. Esplin. 
Counsel submitted the matter without argument. 
The Court reviewed the matters that are currently before it for decision; the motion 
to dismiss, defendant's right to a speedy trial, the issue of double jeopardy, concurrent 
junsdicational issues, entrapment, and Mr. Esplin's oral motion to dimsis for failure of the 
state to produce Mr. Argyle. 
Discussion between Court and counsel. 
The trial date of March 9, 1993 was ordered stricken. 
The Court took this matter under advisement and set further hearing in this matter 
for the 15th day of March, 1993 at 1:15 p.m. 
cc: Utah County Atty. 
Michael D. Esplin 
JLO± 
ADDENDUM B 
Trial Court Ruling of March 15, 1993 
jLJ>J.. , Dtputy 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JAMES ARTHUR BYRNS, 
Defendant. 
JR., 
RULING 
Case No. 921400455 
Judge Lynn W. Davis 
This matter came before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Motion for 
Entrapment. A hearing was held on November 16, 1992 concerning the pending motions. 
Additional memoranda were filed and on December 10, 1992, the Motion to Dismiss was 
submitted for decision. On that same day a hearing was held concerning defendant's Motion 
for Entrapment. Testimony was taken and evidence was received. The hearing was 
continued until March 8, 1993 to take additional testimony and to entertain closing 
arguments. The Court, having heard the evidence and witnesses in support of their 
respective positions, having carefully reviewed the file, and being fully advised in the 
premises, now enters the following: 
RULING 
I. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Defendant was arrested on August 7,1991 and indicted by a federal grand jury on 
August 15, 1991 on one count of Attempt to Manufacture Methamphetamine. This arrest 
was the result of a drug task force effort involving the D.E. A. and local law enforcement 
officers. No other charges were brought in U.S. District Court, for the District of Utah. 
Prior to trial, the federal charges were eventually dismissed based upon a violation the 
Federal Speedy Trial Act and an order granting the dismissal was filed on September 2, 
1992. 
On August 25, 1992, defendant was arrested on the State charges pending in this 
case. Counsel was appointed for defendant. The Preliminary Hearing was conducted on 
September 8, 1992, and defendant was bound over to this Court. On September 29, 1992, 
defendant was arraigned and asserted his right to a speedy trial. The Court accordingly set 
trial within thirty days to begin on October 13, 1992. 
Defendant filed a number of pro se motions between September 25, 1992 and 
December 8, 1992. On October 5, 1992, counsel for defendant filed a Motion for 
Entrapment and accompanying memorandum. On October 9, 1992, the Court held a 
conference call. The topic of the call was to discuss the original trial date in light of the 
defendant's Entrapment motion and to explore possible conflicts of interest. The Court then 
struck the October 13, 1992 trial date and set the matter for hearing on October 13, 1992. 
On October 13, 1992, the trial date was set for December 10, 1992. Defense counsel was to 
file any additional motions by October 19, 1992 and a hearing on all pending motions was 
set for October 28, 1992. 
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On October 28, 1992, this matter came before the Court on the pending motions. 
Defense counsel indicated that he intended to file additional motions and had not yet done so. 
This Court then extended the time for defense counsel to file additional motions until October 
30, 1992. At the October 28, 1992 hearing, defendant refused to waive any constitutional 
rights which might be affected by the Court's action. On November 13, 1992, three days 
before the scheduled hearing, defense counsel filed a Motion to Dismiss based on four 
issues: (1) double jeopardy; (2) subsequent prosecution for the same criminal episode; (3) 
concurrent jurisdiction; and (4) violation of right to a speedy trial. Shortly after this motion 
was filed, defendant retained Michael Esplin, Esq. to represent him in this case. Defendant's 
new counsel requested more time to prepare for trial and time to supplement the motion to 
dismiss and motion for entrapment made by the public defender's office. The Court then 
struck the second trial date and set the Entrapment motion for hearing on December 10, 
1992. 
On December 10, 1992, defendant's entrapment hearing came before this Court. The 
State proceeded with its case. The hearing was continued based on a request by defense 
counsel that the State produce Ross Argyle, the state's informant, as a witness. The State 
agreed to attempt to locate Mr. Argyle and bring him to testify. The Court then continued 
the entrapment hearing until March 8, 1993. The trial was set for March 9, 1993. The 
Court took the other motions under advisement. 
On March 8, 1993, further proceedings were held regarding the entrapment defense. 
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The State was not able to produce Mr. Argyle. (See infra p. 14). The State presented 
additional evidence and rested. The defendant did not put on any witnesses and the 
defendant did not testify. The Court took the entrapment motion under advisement and 
struck the March 9, 1993 trial date. 
n. 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
The defendant has raised four issues in his Motion to Dismiss. Additionally, in his 
supplemental memorandum, defendant argues that his due process rights have been violated. 
This Court will treat each issue separately. 
Ax Ppufrte Jeopardy
 f 
Defendant argues that the state prosecution violates his right not be twice placed in 
jeopardy. This constitutional guarantee is found in the fifth amendment to the United States 
constitution and Article I, § 12 of the Utah Constitution. Defendant argues that he was first 
placed in jeopardy in the federal prosecution. "Jeopardy attaches when an accused in put on 
trial in a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid indictment (or information), and a jury 
has been sworn and impaneled." State v.Pearson. 818 P.2d 581 (Utah App. 1991); Crist v. 
Bretz. 437 U.S. 28 (1978). As the State points out in its opposition memorandum, the 
defendant was not placed in jeopardy during his federal prosecution because the case was 
dismissed prior to trial. The dismissal in the federal court "with prejudice" is not 
synonymous with the attachment of double jeopardy. Accordingly, the Court denies 
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defendant's claim of a violation of his double jeopardy right. 
]L Section 76-1-403 and Single Criminal Episode. 
Defendant argues that the present prosecution is barred by the Utah Single Criminal 
Episode statute. U.C.A. §76-1-403 states in pertinent part: 
If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or more offenses arising out of a 
single criminal episode, a subsequent prosecution for the same or a different 
offense for the same or a different offense arising out of the same criminal 
episode is barred if: 
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an offense that was or should 
have been tried under Subsection 76-1-402 (2) in the former prosecution; and 
(b) The former prosecution; 
(iv) was terminated by final order or judgment for the 
defendant that has not been reversed, set aside, or vacated and 
that necessarily required a determination inconsistent with a fact 
that must be established to secure conviction in the subsequent 
prosecution. 
Section 76-1-402 (2) provides: 
Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single criminal 
episode, unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a defendant shall 
not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single trial court: and 
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the 
defendant is arraigned on the first information or indictment. 
(emphasis added). 
The defendant presupposes that a federal prosecution for offenses arising out of the 
same criminal episode will trigger the protection of the above sections. But as the State has 
noted, the above quoted statute requires that the prior and subsequent prosecution be within 
the jurisdiction of a single trial court. The Court adopts the reasoning of the State's 
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memorandum and accordingly denies defendant's Motion to Dismiss based on section 76-1-
403. 
£L Prosecution in a Concurrent Jurisdiction. 
Defendant argues that the present prosecution is barred by Utah Code Ann. section 
76-1-404, which states: 
If a defendant's conduct establishes the commission of one or more offenses 
within the concurrent jurisdiction of this state and of another jurisdiction, 
federal or state, the prosecution in the other jurisdiction is a bar to a 
subsequent prosecution in this state if (1) the former prosecution resulted in an 
acquittal, conviction, or termination of prosecution, as those terms are defined 
in Section 76-1-403 and (2) the subsequent prosecution is for the same offense 
or offenses 
Defendant argues that the federal dismissal "with prejudice" meets one of the four 
requirements as stated in section 76-1-403 (acquittal, conviction, improperly terminated, or 
terminated by a final order that necessarily required a determination inconsistent with a fact 
that must be proved in a subsequent prosecution). None of these requirements applies to the 
current case. This Court denies defendant's motion based on U.C.A. section 76-1-404. 
H. Due Process and the Right to a Speedy Trial. 
The defendant alleges a violation of his right to a speedy trial. Related to that 
argument, he further alleges a violation of federal due process. This argument appears to be 
a variation of defendant's double jeopardy argument. Defendant relies on State v. Shabata. 
678 P.2d 785 (Utah 1984) and United States v. Belcher. 762 F.Supp. 666 (W.D. Va. 1991). 
In Shabata. state prosecutors were charged with the knowledge of investigators based on the 
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rationale that prosecutors and law enforcement officers make up the prosecutorial team. In 
Belcher, the former prosecution was brought in state court and subsequently in federal court 
by a single prosecutor who had authority to prosecute in both jurisdictions. 
The defendant reasons that since federal and state officers were involved in the 
underlying investigation which was common to both the federal and state prosecutions, that 
the subsequent state prosecution should therefore be bound by result in the federal 
prosecution. At very least, defendant urges that the time he spent should be considered for 
purposes of speedy trial purposes. 
The Utah Supreme Court has addressed the issue of subsequent prosecution by 
different jurisdictions. State v. Franklin. 735 P.2d 34 (Utah 1987). In Franklin, the state 
prosecution took place after the federal prosecution had concluded. In discussing the 
rationale for allowing subsequent state prosecution the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
We do not agree with the above-described approach because it relinquishes 
unnecessarily the power of the state to try and punish those who break its 
laws. Under the rule urged by defendant, the State of Utah would be 
foreclosed from legitimate prosecutions by the errors, omissions, or 
inadequacies of federal prosecutions and would be unable to try even a 
defendant who had received a federal pardon or whose conviction was reversed 
by a federal appellate court because of an error in the federal trial. See, e.g., 
State v. LeCoure. 158 Mont. 340, 491 P.2d 1228 (1971) (defendant acquitted 
of federal charges based on assault of F.B.I, agent because federal prosecutor 
did not prove agent was acting within his official capacity at time of assault 
and double jeopardy barred state law assault charges). We note also that the 
approach urged by defendant, under which the federal prosecution would be 
treated as if it were a Utah proceeding, would allow the federal government to 
destroy Utah's right to try defendant merely by bringing defendant to trial for 
some minor lesser included offense. See Brown v. QhioT 432 U.S. 161 (1977). 
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Defendant asks us to contrast the benefits to the state from the 
dual-sovereignty doctrine, which he deems slight, with the unfairness to the 
individual that may result from two trials. The protection against multiple 
trials perceived by defendant is largely illusory. Were we to hold that Utah 
could not try individuals because they had been previously tried in a federal 
court, we still could not prevent the federal government from trying 
individuals after they had been tried by Utah; we would thus be surrendering 
state sovereignty in exchange for a more theoretical than real gain in individual 
rights. 
Franklin, at 38. Additionally, the Utah Supreme Court has also held that the time a 
defendant spends in federal custody cannot be counted against the state for speedy trial 
purposes. State v. Trafhy. 799 P.2d 704 (Utah 1990). 
Accordingly, this Court rejects defendants reasoning and determines that defendant's 
due process rights are not violated by the subsequent state prosecution. Specifically, this 
Court will not hold the state prosecution responsible for procedural errors in federal court. 
The Court also finds that defendant's right to a speedy trial has not been violated. Defendant 
waived his right to a speedy trial at the December 10, 1992 hearing. The delays prior to the 
December 10, 1992 trial date occurred as a result of defendants pro se motions and defense 
counsel's motions discussed above. The state has been ready to proceed at every stage of 
this case and has not caused the delays. This Court denies defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
based on an alleged violation of defendant's right to a speedy trial. 
n. 
ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE 
Defendant also argues that the charges should be dismissed due to entrapment by the 
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law enforcement officers. Defendant alleges in his Memorandum in Support that Ross 
Argyle, acting as a government agent, improperly enticed defendant while both were 
incarcerated in Oregon. (See Defendant's Memorandum in Support re: Entrapment, p.2) 
Section 76-2-303 states the standard governing entrapment determinations. 
76-2-303. Entrapment. 
(1) It is a defense that the actor was entrapped into committing the offense. 
Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement officer or a person directed by or 
acting in cooperation with the officer induces the commission of an offense in 
order to obtain evidence of the commission for prosecution by methods 
creating a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by one not 
otherwise ready to commit it. Conduct merely affording a person an 
opportunity to commit an offense does not constitute entrapment. 
Once an entrapment defense has been asserted, it is the burden of the prosecution to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was not entrapped. State v. Wilson. 565 
P.2d 66 (Utah 1977). The entrapment defense can be seen as an attack on the state's burden 
to prove that defendant acted voluntarily. State v. Curtis, 542 P.2d 744 (Utah 1975). 
The statute cited above incorporates an objective standard. "[T]he focus is not on the 
propensities and predisposition of the specific defendant, but on whether the police conduct 
revealed in the particular case falls below standards, to which common feelings respond, for 
the proper use of government power; the subjective test is specifically rejected." State v. 
Taylor, 599 P.2d 496 (Utah 1979)- The standard for finding that entrapment has occurred is 
a factual finding that the conduct of the law enforcement officers or their undercover partners 
creates a substantial risk that the offense could be committed by one not otherwise ready to 
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commit it. The statute prohibits active inducement, luring an average person into the 
commission of an offense. 
Recently, the Utah Court of Appeals discussed a trial court's denial of an entrapment 
motion. State v. Gallegos. 207 Utah Adv. 53 (Utah App. 1993). In Gallegos. the police 
employed a convicted felon as a confidential informant. In upholding the trial court's 
decision the court of appeals stated: "At no time in any of the transactions did Bennett 
employ inducements that would have been, as a matter of law, sufficient to induce an 
ordinary person to commit the crimes for which defendant was convicted/ Id. at 55. 
Therefore, agents of law enforcement officers are treated under the objective standard as 
well. 
The Court has reviewed the transcripts of telephone calls placed to the defendant 
between the dates of August 2, and August 7, 1991. Both parties have stipulated as to the 
accuracy of the transcript and the Court admitted the transcript. Additionally, the Court 
heard testimony from many of the officers involved in the investigation. After carefully 
reviewing all the evidence presented, this Court determines that the State has proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the law enforcement conduct did not create a substantial risk that the 
offense would be committed by one not otherwise ready to commit it. Also, in the present 
case there is nothing in the recorded transcripts on conversations between the defendant and 
Argyle that demonstrates an "inducement" offered by Argyle to defendant. 
The facts supporting this determination are numerous. The transcript of the telephone 
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conversations between August 2, and August 7 are replete with statements by defendant 
demonstrating his willingness and eagerness to set up a methamphetamine lab. For example, 
conversation between the defendant and Ross Argyle made on August 2, 1991 at 10:20 a.m. 
demonstrate this point. The defendant also fully understood the risk he was taking.1 Rather 
1
 On August 3, 1991, telephone call beginning at 8:55 p.m., page four, the defendant 
and Charles Illsley had the following conversation: 
Jim: Yeah right. It, we, we, we can, we can make ten million dollars, you 
know, a million, ten million. We can make fifty million, if everybody 
has the balls to do it, but the 
Charles: If I didn't have, if I didnft have the balls, I wouldn't have been running 
around. 
Jim: The larger you do it though, the more chance you take, you see what 
I'm saying? 
Charles: Yeah. 
Jim: I'm only talking about a one shot deal and then laying low. 
Later in the same conversation, page 6, the defendant demonstrates the risks to himself if 
arrested: 
Jim: I'm not trying to come off as a hard guy. 
Charles: I mean, no, I hear you, you got to be careful. 
Jim: I'm just trying to tell you what we can do and what we can't do. 
Charles: You know, if you're not careful, you end up doing time, and I ain't 
doing time. 
Jim: Yeah, that's the whole thing. 
Charles: Behind this. 
Jim: Yeah, and ain't none of us going to do time because I'm, I'm, I'll go 
down the hard way, you know, this time cause 
Charles: Yeah. 
Jim: You know, you know what, this time, this is my third time, I'll, I'll do 
to much time, you know, a lot of time. 
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than arm twist the defendant into coming to Utah, the officers involved merely provided the 
defendant with an opportunity to set up the lab. The statements in the transcript and the 
testimony of the officers are consistent. The defendant planned on coming to Utah, setting 
up a Meth lab, selling the product, and dividing the proceeds between himself, Ross Argyle, 
and an undercover DEA agent, Charles Illsley. The defendant specifically requested money 
from agent Illsley and the Court specifically finds that the defendant's request for "tuition" 
did not induce defendant to come to Utah and set up the lab. The ten thousand dollars was 
the amount agent Illsley agreed to pay defendant for learning how to produce 
methamphetamine. 
The Court therefore determines that the State has met its burden of proving voluntary 
action on the part of the defendant and the defendant's Motion for Entrapment is hereby 
denied. 
m. 
ESSENTIAL WITNESS 
Defendant made an oral motion at the March 8, 1993 hearing that defendant has been 
denied due process because of the failure of the State to produce an essential witness. The 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 12, and the sixth amendment of the United States 
Constitution provide, among the rights afforded an accused, the right to compulsory process 
for defense witnesses. The issue before this Court is, whether the unavailability of a 
proposed defense witness violates due process of law. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has stated: "The purpose of due process is to prevent 
fundamental unfairness, and one of its essential elements is the opportunity to defend." State 
Y. Masstas, 815 P.2d 1319 (Utah 1991). Although this Court has been unable to locate any 
authority directly addressing the occasion where a proposed witness is unavailable, this Court 
believes that cases interpreting U.C.A. Section 77-21-3 are analogous. Section 77-21-3 
provides for issuance of a certificate of attendance in criminal cases for material witnesses. 
In State v. Sehrender, 712 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985), the defendant challenged the trial court's 
denial of issuing a certificate for attendance of a witness. The supreme court held that 
"[fjailure to demonstrate materiality as required by statute is a basis for affirming the trial 
court's ruling." The supreme court went on to state: 
The sixth amendment to the federal constitution guarantees that '[i]n all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor....' In Washington v, Texas, 388 
U.S. 14 (1967), the United States Supreme Court found a violation of this 
guarantee where the defendant had been arbitrarily deprived of 'testimony 
[that] would have been relevant and material, and... vital to the defense.' Id-
at 16 (emphasis added). In United States v. Valenzuela-Bemal. 458 U.S. 858 
(1982), the Supreme Court reasoned that the language of the sixth amendment 
and of Washington suggested that a criminal defendant, in order to establish a 
violation of his constitutional right to compulsory process, must make some 
plausible showing that the testimony of the absent witness 'would have been 
both material and favorable to his defense.' Id. at 873 (footnote omitted). 
Testimony is material, and its exclusion is therefore prejudicial, if there is a 
reasonable probability that its presence would affect the outcome of the trial. 
'A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in 
the outcome.* Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, , 104 S. Ct. 2052, 
2068 (1984). 
'The proper standard of materiality must reflect our overriding concern 
with the justice of the finding of guilt.... This means that the omission must be 
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evaluated in the context of the entire record. If there is no reasonable doubt 
about guilt whether or not the evidence is considered, there is no justification 
for a new trial. On the other hand, if the verdict is already of questionable 
validity, additional evidence of relatively minor importance might be sufficient 
to create a reasonable doubt.9 
Id. This Court will apply the above principles to the present case. 
There is no dispute as to the State's willingness to produce Mr. Argyle. The 
defendant requested that the State produce Argyle as a witness at the hearing and trial. The 
State was not able to locate Argyle and Mr. Taylor proffered that the State had attempted to 
locate Argyle at the address provided by defense counsel, attempted to locate him in Utah 
and in Oregon, and that the State had placed an investigator on the problem without avail. 
The Court determines that based on the above, Argyle is not an material witness and 
therefore not essential in order to provide the defendant with due process of law. In support 
of this determination the Court finds the following facts based on testimony presented at the 
hearing: (1) Ross Argyle acted as a confidential informant during the investigation; (2) that 
Argyle became an informant after his extradition to Utah on probation violation charges; (3) 
that Argyle was provided renumeration for information; (4) all conversations between Argyle 
and defendant made while Argyle was in Provo were tape recorded. There was no evidence 
presented to the Court that Argyle was an agent for the DEA or other law enforcement 
agency prior to his extradition to Utah. Only by making some kind of showing that Argyle 
was an agent while incarcerated with the defendant could the defendant raise the materiality 
of Argylefs actions during that period. 
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The Court hereby denies defendant's motion for dismissal based on violation of due 
process of law. 
Dated this ^ f d a y of March, 1993. 
cc: Jim Taylor 
Michael Esplin 
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